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I. Introduction 
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 (Dodd-Frank) provides 
a private cause of action to certain persons who notify the government of illegalities occurring 
within the financial industry, then subsequently experience employer retaliation for such 
notification.2 These persons are generally referred to as “whistleblowers.” Confusion has arisen 
over who merits protection because the Dodd-Frank definition of whistleblower arguably conflicts 
with the statute’s anti-retaliation provision.3 Although the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) has issued regulations which attempt to resolve the potential ambiguity created by the 
statutory conflict,4 courts have taken varying approaches leading to conflicting conclusions as to 
whether statutory ambiguity exists, and if so, whether to defer to the SEC’s interpretation of the 
statute. I begin with a brief overview of the legislative backdrop to Dodd-Frank and proceed to 
analyze the statutory text and the SEC’s implementation thereunder. Next, I provide taxonomy of 
the case law addressing the statute: opinions protecting whistleblowers who report to entities other 
than the SEC;5 courts finding the statute to be ambiguous, but nonetheless deferring to the SEC;6 
and a third group of cases finding Dodd-Frank to require whistleblowers to make disclosures 
directly to the SEC.7 I then conclude that employer anti-retaliation protection should only be 
available to whistleblowers who provide the SEC with information in a manner subject to the SEC’s 
discretion. Under my theory, the Commission was given direct authority to establish the manner in 
                                                          
1 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
2 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). 
3 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (2014). 
5 See, e.g., Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
6 See, e.g., Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G., 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing six district court cases). 
7 See, e.g., Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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which it would receive information, and pursuant to this authority, the Commission established this 
manner through various regulations which implement Dodd-Frank.8 
II. Legislative Backdrop to the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program 
 In 2010, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank after determining that reform of existing securities 
laws were generally necessary due to the terrible toll which the 2008 financial crisis exacted on the 
U.S. economy.9 Congress included a new and robust “Whistleblower Program”10 to motivate 
persons possessing reasonable belief of potential securities laws violations to inform the SEC of 
their suspicion.11 Generally, Congress favorably views persons who notify the government of 
potential illegalities, customarily termed “whistleblowers,” because the information which the 
government receives frequently helps rectify illegal behavior.12 Specifically, Congress designed the 
Whistleblower Program to motivate persons possessing reasonable belief of potential securities 
laws violations to inform the SEC of their suspicion.13  
 Congress attempted to provide whistleblower protection because the information provided 
by whistleblowers would often not be easily discovered through external SEC investigations.14 
Therefore, Congress sought to incentivize whistleblowers to file more reports, which, in turn, would 
improve the transparency of the financial system and decrease the likelihood of another financial 
crisis materializing.15 Certified Fraud Examiner and Madoff whistleblower Harry Markopolos 
demonstrated the historical efficiency of whistleblower programs when he testified in front of the 
                                                          
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b). 
9 S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 39-40. 
10 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). 
11 S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 39-40. 
12 Id. at 40. 
13 Id. at 38. 
14 Id. at 39-40. 
15 The Dodd-Frank Act declares its purpose: “To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving ... 
transparency in the financial system ... to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.” The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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Senate Banking Committee16 urging enactment of the Whistleblower Program. Markopolos cited 
statistics showing the historical efficacy of such programs where “whistleblower tips detected 
54.1% of uncovered fraud schemes in public companies,”17 while SEC exam teams, and all other 
external auditors, “detected a mere 4.1%.”18 Notably, whistleblower tips were also shown to be 
thirteen times more effective than all external audits.19 
 Due to the demonstrated success of whistleblowing, Congress attempted to solve the 
historical impediments faced by whistleblowers. The most significant of such impediments is the 
deterrence factor which prevents employees who may wish to notify the government of wrongdoing 
from doing so due to the potential risk of adverse employment action in retaliation for such 
whistleblowing. The concept is not new; other federal statutes afford anti-retaliation protection to 
whistleblowers,20 making illegal employer discrimination against such employees. Per Dodd-Frank, 
Congress expanded whistleblower protection within the financial industry through various means. 
 The broader scope of the new Whistleblower Program seeks to increase motivation for 
“potential whistleblowers to come forward and help the government identify and prosecute 
fraudsters,”21 by incentivizing whistleblowers with monetary awards, and through expanding the 
definition of whistleblower and thereby extending anti-retaliation protection to more persons.22 
Congress incentivized whistleblowers by authorizing monetary awards for whistleblowers who 
provide information which leads to government recoveries equaling or exceeding one million 
dollars.23 The new anti-retaliation provision protects whistleblowers from employers who 
                                                          
16 S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 110-11. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., 1 Lit. Wrong. Discharge Claims § 2:86 (listing federal statutes containing anti-retaliation provisions). 
21 S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 112-114. 
22 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (clarifying that subsidiaries and affiliates of issuers may not retaliate against 
whistleblowers, eliminating a defense often raised by issuers). 
23 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b). 
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“discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner 
discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment.”24 Specifically, 
this provision prohibits employer retaliation stemming from lawful acts committed by 
whistleblowers in providing information to, or assisting the SEC with, investigations or actions 
concerning their employers’ potential securities law violations, and in making disclosures that are 
required or protected under any other law, rule, or regulation within the SEC’s jurisdiction.25 
Congress directly delegated authority to the SEC to develop specific regulations implementing such 
provisions.26 
 Pursuant to such authority, the SEC proposed 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b),27 and, as is 
customary in administrative agency rule issuance, interested groups and individuals submitted 
comments which the SEC considered before finalizing the rules.28 The National Whistleblowers 
Center (NWC)29 submitted one such comment which informed the SEC of the results of its study 
on qui tam30 actions filed between 2007 and 2010. In the NWC conducted study, nearly all 
whistleblowers were found to have first attempted to resolve matters through internal means by 
speaking with their superiors, filing an internal complaint, or both.31 In finalizing § 240.21F-2(b), 
the SEC expressly sought to “ensure that the whistleblower program does not undermine the 
willingness of individuals to make whistleblower reports internally at their companies before they 
                                                          
24 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1). 
25 Id. 
26 15 U.S.C. § 78w (2010). 
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b). 
28 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488, 70,488 (Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].  
29 See NWC Comment to Proposed Rules, Impact of Qui Tam Laws on Internal Compliance: A Report to the Securities 
Exchange Commission, at 6 (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter NWC Comment]. 
30 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (illustrating qui tam actions filed by relators). 
31 NWC Comment at 8. 
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make reports to the Commission.”32 In light of documented whistleblower discrimination, the SEC 
determined the decision of “whether or not to internally report is best left for whistleblowers.”33  
 While the anti-retaliation provision generally prohibits  employer discrimination by reason 
of whistleblower notification of potential employer illegality pertaining to securities laws, since its 
enactment, federal courts are divided over whether protection is solely available to whistleblowers 
who provide information directly to the SEC, or whether protection is also available to 
whistleblowers who report violations internally, do not notify the SEC, and subsequently 
experience employment retaliation. This inconsistency creates the likelihood that employees will 
first report to the SEC, even though the SEC provides strong incentives34 for individuals to report 
internally in the first instance, if appropriate.35 
III. The Text of the Whistleblower Program 
 The Whistleblower Program provides a private cause of action for whistleblowers who 
experience adverse employment action from their employers. Confusion has arisen over who merits 
protection because the statutory definition of the term whistleblower has been found to conflict with 
statutory enumerations of whistleblower activities protected under the anti-retaliation provision. 
The Whistleblower Program provides the following definition of whistleblower: 
The term “whistleblower” means any individual who provides, or 2 or more 
individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the 
securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by 
the Commission.36 
This clause, when read in isolation, would seem to require an individual to submit information 
directly to the Commission in order to fall within this definition.  However, various courts have 
                                                          
32 Proposed Rules at 70,490. 
33 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,326-34,327 (June 13, 2011) 
[hereinafter Adopting Release]. 
34 Adopting Release at 34,301. 
35 Adopting Release at 34,322. 
36 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
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found the anti-retaliation provision in Dodd-Frank to be irreconcilable with this statutory definition. 
The anti-retaliation provision prohibits employer retaliation by reason of three distinct 
whistleblower undertakings: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or 
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms 
and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower-
- 
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this section; 
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or 
administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such 
information; or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter, including section 78j-1(m) 
of this title, section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”37  
Under the first two subsections, the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision explicitly prohibits 
employer discrimination against whistleblowers who provide information to the Commission, or 
assist the Commission in an action based upon information which was provided to the 
Commission.38 Unlike the first two subsections, the third subsection does not require direct 
disclosure to the Commission; employer discrimination is prohibited against whistleblowers who 
make required or protected disclosures which fall into one of four categories, which, in many 
instances, do not involve the Commission.  Thus, it is this third subsection that merits further 
attention. 
 The first category within the third subsection of the anti-retaliation provision prohibits 
discrimination against whistleblowers who make required or protected disclosures under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The SOX provides whistleblower protection for employees of 
publicly traded companies where any employee is threatened “in the terms and conditions of 
                                                          
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added). 
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). 
9 
 
employment” because of acts committed to assist in an investigation regarding conduct reasonably 
believed to be in violation of any SEC rule or regulation, “or any provision of Federal law relating 
to fraud against shareholders,” where  
[I]nformation or assistance is provided to, or the investigation is conducted by: 
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; 
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or 
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person 
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate 
misconduct).39 
 Whistleblowers making required or protected disclosures under “this chapter, including 
section 78j-1(m) of this title”40 fall into the second category of the third subsection of the Dodd-
Frank anti-retaliation provision. Section 78j-1(m) specifies audit reporting requirements.41 The 
third category within the third subsection of the anti-retaliation provision, enumerating required or 
protected whistleblower disclosures, are those made under “section 1513(e) of Title 18.”42 Under § 
1513(e), “whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate,” takes any harmful action “for providing 
to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of any Federal offense,” is in violation of the statute.43 The final category incorporates 
whistleblower disclosures which are required or protected under “any other law, rule, or regulation 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”44 This is the catchall provision. 
A. SEC Implementation of the Whistleblower Program 
 Congress explicitly mandated the SEC to issue regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank 
Whistleblower Program.45 Within one such regulation,46 the SEC distinguished between the term 
                                                          
39 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
40 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
41 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2010). 
42 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
43 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2008). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(a). 
46 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2. 
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whistleblower as it pertains to persons eligible to receive awards, and as to persons subject to anti-
retaliation protection.47 Under the former, for potential award eligibility: 
You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you provide the Commission 
with information ... and the information relates to a possible violation of the federal 
securities laws.48 
The regulation proceeds:  
For purposes of the protections afforded by [the anti-retaliation provision] ... you are 
a whistleblower if you provide information in a manner described in [the anti-
retaliation provision].49  
Therefore, the SEC has taken the stance that whistleblowers must disclose to the SEC in order to 
be eligible to receive an award, but doing so is not necessary in order to receive anti-retaliation 
protection.  This is so because the regulation incorporates the required or protected disclosures 
found within the four categories of the third subsection of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision 
into the definition of whistleblower for purposes of determining who warrants employer retaliation 
protection. The regulation then confirms: “The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you 
satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.”50  
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Whistleblower Program 
 Under the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, courts mainly fall into two different camps 
concerning the issue of whether employment retaliation protection is solely available for 
whistleblowers who provide information of potential securities laws violations directly to the SEC, 
or whether protection may also be available for whistleblowers who exclusively report violations 
internally to their employers. The majority view among the district courts holds that direct 
disclosure to the SEC is not necessary, provided at least one of the other required or protected 
                                                          
47 Id. 
48 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(2). 
49 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i)-(ii). 
50 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(iii). 
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disclosures set out in the anti-retaliation provision are met.51 There are two means by which courts 
reach this conclusion. Under one approach, courts find that the Whistleblower Program is 
unambiguous and also find the anti-retaliation provision to constitute an implied exception to the 
statutory whistleblower definition. Under the second approach, courts reach this same conclusion 
by finding the Whistleblower Program to be ambiguous,52 and then defer to SEC regulations.53 
Courts which have found the whistleblower definition and anti-retaliation provisions to conflict 
have noted that the latter would be rendered superfluous54 if disclosure to the SEC was a necessary 
prerequisite for anti-retaliation protection. Courts in the opposing camp find that the Whistleblower 
Program is unambiguous in that it requires disclosure to the SEC to meet the definition. The issue 
is not ripe for Supreme Court review,55 even though a majority of district courts have found the 
Whistleblower Program to be ambiguous, because the Fifth Circuit56 remains the only circuit court 
to have directly ruled upon this issue.  
1. District Courts Finding Whistleblower to Encompass Disclosure to Other-than-SEC Entities  
 Prior to the SEC issuing final regulations, the Southern District of New York, in Egan v. 
TradingScreen, Inc.,57 was confronted with a scenario where an employee of a financial software 
company reported his suspicion to the company’s president that the CEO of the company illegally 
was diverting assets, and allegedly the reporting employee was then terminated.58 The issue before 
                                                          
51 Id. 
52 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
53 Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Berman, v. 
Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., No. 1:14-CV-523-GHW-SN, 2014 WL 6860583, at 62  (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014). 
54 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 85 (2001). 
55 See, e.g., Lawson v. FMR L.L.C., 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1175 (2014) (extending whistleblower protection to employees 
of private contractors and to subcontractors serving public companies). 
56 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
57 Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
58 Id. at *1-2. 
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the court was whether the internal report and subsequent termination provided the employee with a 
private cause of action under the Whistleblower Program.59 The District Court held: 
[T]he contradictory provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act are best harmonized by 
reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of certain whistleblower 
disclosures not requiring reporting to the SEC as a narrow exception to 15 U.S.C. § 
78u–6(a)(6)’s definition of a whistleblower as one who reports to the SEC.60   
 Similarly, Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C.61 confronted the Federal District Court of 
Nebraska with a situation where a licensed Certified Public Accountant (CPA), working as an 
independent contractor for an independent securities clearing firm, complied with requests from the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), despite her employer’s request that she “stall, 
delay, stop digging, and stop responding” 62 to such requests. The CPA was subsequently 
terminated, allegedly for disclosing securities violations through internal means.63 The District 
Court held that the CPA’s actions constituted protected activity under Dodd-Frank, and found “the 
result flows from the statute itself, and it is not necessary to determine if deference to the SEC's 
construction of the statute is warranted.”64 The court stated the anti-retaliation provision “covers a 
broad array of disclosures to entities other than the SEC,”65 and by complying and cooperating with 
FINRA’s investigation and through preparing a report regarding violations, the CPA made 
disclosures which were “required by a rule subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.”66 The court 
acknowledged statutory definitions usually control the meaning of statutory words, then proceeded 
                                                          
59 Id. at *3-4. 
60 Id. at *5. 
61 Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *1 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to 
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014). 
62 Id. at *6. 
63 Id. at *7. 
64 Id. at *15. 
65 Id. at *6. 
66 Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *16 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to 
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014). 
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to read the anti-retaliation provision “using the word ‘whistleblower’ in its everyday sense.”67 The 
court cited the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary and the Black's Law Dictionary and noted that, 
in its everyday use, a whistleblower is “a person who tells police, reporters, etc., about something 
(such as a crime) that has been kept secret, [or an] employee who reports employer wrongdoing to 
a governmental or law-enforcement agency.”68 The court opined “if this reading of the term 
‘whistleblower’ is applied to the anti-retaliation provision—while maintaining the statutory 
definition for the other subsections, which deal solely with the bounty program—all parts of the 
statute fit together into a harmonious and coherent whole.”69 The District Court justified its method 
by stating: “when applying the definition to the provision at issue would defeat that provision’s 
purpose, the Court will not mechanically read the statutory definition into that provision,”70 and 
noted that a failure to do so would render the anti-retaliation provision “insignificant, and its 
purpose—to shield a broad range of employee disclosures—[would] be thwarted.”71 
 A majority of district courts have reached this same result by plugging the statutory 
definition of whistleblower into the substantive anti-retaliation provision. Courts doing so find the 
resulting conflict to render the Whistleblower Program ambiguous. Courts find ambiguity because 
a literal reading of the definition of the term whistleblower, “any individual who provides ... 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission,”72 into the anti-
retaliation provision, which protects whistleblowers who make disclosures to individuals or entities 
other than the SEC, potentially renders the anti-retaliation provision superfluous.73 In Rosenblum 
                                                          
67 Id. at *11. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at *11-12. 
70 Id. 
71 Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *11 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to 
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014). 
72 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
73 See 12 U.S.C. § 5302 (2008) (setting forth severability clause of Dodd-Frank). 
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v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C.,74 a case which adequately summarizes the view held by a 
majority of district courts, the Southern District of New York opined, when considering the Dodd-
Frank Whistleblower Program “as a whole, it is plain that a narrow reading of the statute requiring 
a report to the SEC conflicts with the anti-retaliation provision, which does not have such a 
requirement.”75 There, an employee was allegedly harassed and ultimately terminated after 
informing his supervisors, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), of a potential 
securities law violation.76 Despite not notifying the SEC, the court found that SOX protected 
disclosures of this type, thus the employee plausibly stated protected activity under Dodd-Frank.77 
This caused the court to declare the Whistleblower Program ambiguous.78 Next, the court found it 
appropriate to consider the SEC's interpretation of the statute and regulations thereunder.79 The 
court then stated “the 2011 rule promulgated by the SEC, which was given authority by Congress 
to implement [the Whistleblower Program], does not require a report to the SEC in order to obtain 
whistleblower protection.”80  
2. Courts Finding the Whistleblower Program Unambiguous in its Requirement of Disclosure 
to the SEC 
 The Fifth Circuit, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,81 also found the Whistleblower 
Program to be unambiguous, but unlike the Southern District of New York in Egan v. 
TradingScreen, Inc.,82 nor the Federal District Court of Nebraska in Bussing v. COR Clearing, 
                                                          
74 Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
75 Id. at 147-48. 
76 Id. at 145. 
77 Id. at 148. 
78 Id. at 146. 
79 Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
80 Id. at 148. 
81 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
82 Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
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L.L.C.,83 the Fifth Circuit found the statute, “standing alone, expressly and unambiguously requires 
that an individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a whistleblower for purposes of the 
anti-retaliation provision.”84 In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., an employee served as G.E. 
Energy’s Iraq Country Executive in Amman, Jordan.85 When Iraqi officials informed the employee 
“of their concern that GE Energy hired a woman closely associated with a senior Iraqi official to 
curry favor with that official in negotiating a lucrative joint venture agreement,”86 the employee 
reported the potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violation to his supervisor as well as 
a G.E. Energy ombudsperson.87 Thereafter, the employee allegedly received a negative 
performance review, was demoted, and eventually was terminated.88 In finding the Whistleblower 
Program unambiguous, the court stated that the statutory language answers two questions: “(1) who 
is protected; and (2) what actions constitute protected activity.”89 The court also found “under the 
plain language and structure of Dodd–Frank, there are not conflicting definitions of 
whistleblower.”90 The Fifth Circuit decided that the third category of disclosures covered by the 
anti-retaliation provision91 was not rendered superfluous because it would still protect individuals 
who first filed a complaint with the SEC, then experienced retaliation for required or protected 
disclosures under the securities laws, at a time when the employer lacked knowledge of the 
employee’s disclosure to the SEC.92 
                                                          
83 Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *1 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to 
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014). 
84 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013). 
85 Id. at 621. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2013). 
90 Id. at 626. 
91 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
92 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627-628 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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 Likewise, the Northern District of California, in Banko v. Apple Inc.,93 followed the Fifth 
Circuit’s Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.94 holding and determined Dodd-Frank only affords 
whistleblower protection to individuals who meet the definition of whistleblower through 
disclosing information directly to the SEC.95 In Banko v. Apple Inc., an employee gained knowledge 
of a co-worker’s retention incentives and reimbursement for personal expenses which potentially 
violated applicable securities laws.96 The employee reported the conduct to the company’s human 
resources department, and then the co-worker was terminated.97 Shortly thereafter, the reporting 
employee experienced animosity from other co-workers, and then the reporting employee was 
terminated.98 The court found that whistleblower protection is only available to individuals who 
meet the statutory definition of a whistleblower because “a contrary conclusion would ignore 
several canons of statutory interpretation.”99 The court stated that the words “to the 
Commission,”100 within the whistleblower definition, would violate the surplusage canon if 
ignored, and that allowing individuals who do not satisfy the definition to bring a claim would 
contradict the anti-retaliation provision’s title: “Protection of Whistleblowers.”101 
IV. Overview of Analysis 
 Employer anti-retaliation protection should only be available to whistleblowers, i.e. only if 
made by individuals who provide “information ... to the Commission, in a manner established, by 
rule or regulation, by the Commission.”102 This notion reaches the same result as both the Southern 
                                                          
93 Banko v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 2013 WL 7394596, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013). 
94 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627-628 (5th Cir. 2013). 
95 Banko v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 2013 WL 7394596, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at *3-4. 
98 Id. at *4. 
99 Id. at *7. 
100 Id. at *8. 
101 Id. 
102 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
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District of New York’s holding in Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., which held the “contradictory 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are best harmonized by reading the anti-retaliation provision as 
a narrow exception to the whistleblower definition,”103 and also the Federal District Court of 
Nebraska’s opinion in Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., which construed the statute with dictionary 
definitions of whistleblower, then found protection for internal reports “flows from the statute 
itself.”104 Unlike in Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., where the court could not defer to SEC regulations 
because the case was decided six days before the regulations were finalized, and dissimilar to 
Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., which disregarded the statutory definition of whistleblower and 
instead deferred to two dictionaries,105 the protection of persons who report to entities other than 
the SEC is warranted when Dodd-Frank, its predecessors, amendments and concomitant 
authorizations, as well as the regulations thereunder, are read as a whole. While the anti-retaliation 
provision protects whistleblowers who make disclosures to entities other than the SEC, these 
disclosures are still made by persons who satisfy the statutory definition of whistleblower. This is 
so because Congress explicitly delegated authority to the SEC to establish “by rule or regulation”106 
the manner in which it would receive information from whistleblowers. This authorization is 
directly found in the statutory definition of whistleblower.107 This argument does not have known 
support from sources other than Dodd-Frank and the SEC rules and regulations thereunder. 
A. Transparent Analysis of the SEC’s Judicature 
 Congress explicitly authorized the SEC to make rules and regulations to “classify persons 
... reports,”108 and other matters within the SEC’s jurisdiction and to “prescribe greater, lesser, or 
                                                          
103 Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
104 Id. 
105 Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *11 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to 
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014). 
106 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
107 Id. 
108 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2000). 
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different requirements for different classes thereof.”109 For purposes of the anti-retaliation 
provision, the authority to “classify persons” should include the power to designate persons who 
may be considered whistleblowers, and the authority to “classify reports” should provide the SEC 
with authority to designate internally filed reports as “subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission.”110 Under the SEC regulations, persons are only required to directly provide the 
Commission with information for purposes of the bounty program;111 for purposes of the anti-
retaliation provision, protection is afforded where information is provided in a manner consistent 
with that provision.112 Dodd-Frank is unambiguous in this regard. This outcome is similarly reached 
by finding the anti-retaliation provision to conflict with the statutory definition of whistleblower, 
then deferring to the SEC. Because this result encourages whistleblowing, courts in this camp 
further the basic policy behind the very existence of securities regulation, which is to improve 
transparency within the financial markets; achieving transparency is also the purpose of the Dodd-
Frank Act.113  
 As previously noted, the Whistleblower Program defines a whistleblower as: “any 
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating 
to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or 
regulation, by the Commission.”114 The Commission established the manner: 
To be considered a whistleblower under [the Whistleblower Program], you must 
submit your information about a possible securities law violation by either of these 
methods:  
(1) Online, through the Commission’s website located at www.sec.gov; or  
                                                          
109 Id. 
110 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
111 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(2). 
112 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i)-(ii). 
113 The Dodd-Frank Act declares its purpose: “To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving ... 
transparency in the financial system ... to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.” The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
114 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
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(2) By mailing or faxing a Form TCR ... to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower.115 
 
Form TCR stands for “Tips, Complaints, and Referrals.”116 Separate government entities may use 
this form when referring matters to the SEC. The SEC has also provided that “the Commission 
may, in its sole discretion, waive any of these procedures based upon a showing of extraordinary 
circumstances.”117 Congress provided the SEC with authority to establish regulations which 
implement Dodd-Frank. This authority included establishing the manner in which the SEC would 
receive information. Under this authority, the SEC issued a regulation which established the manner 
in which it would receive reports, and also issued a regulation which reserved its right to change 
the manner in which it would receive reports. Therefore, the manner in which the SEC will receive 
reports remains within the SEC’s discretion. When the Congressional authorization contained 
within the definition of whistleblower along with the regulations are viewed in the aggregate, the 
SEC has implied that one manner in which it will accept information is through referrals from 
separate agencies; under extraordinary circumstances, the SEC may also waive this requirement.118 
As previously mentioned, the SEC has provided: “the anti-retaliation protections apply whether or 
not you satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.”119 Therefore, 
if an extraordinary circumstance is not found, a person not satisfying the aforementioned 
regulations should still be considered a whistleblower, and the anti-retaliation provisions should 
still provide protection, despite the fact that the whistleblower cannot receive an award. Further 
SEC rulemaking authority is explicit in the Whistleblower Program: 
                                                          
115 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9 (2015) (emphasis added). 
116 17 C.F.R. § 249.1800 (2015). 
117 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8 (2014). 
118 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(iii). 
119 Id. 
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The Commission shall have the authority to issue such rules and regulations as may 
be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this section consistent 
with the purposes of this section.120 
The entire purpose of the whistleblowing strategy is to improve transparency in the financial 
system.121 Restricting the definition of whistleblowers to only those individuals who report 
violations of the securities laws to the Commission becomes an unacceptable impediment to 
improving transparency in the financial system because various violations of the securities laws do 
not require direct reporting122 of violations to the SEC.123  
 Similarly, because Congress included disclosure methods within the anti-retaliation 
provision which do not require direct disclosure to the SEC, legislative intent to protect persons 
who do not report directly to the SEC may be understood through the statutory text. This remains 
true despite the statutory definition of whistleblower. Specifically, the anti-retaliation provision 
prohibits employer retaliation by reason of three distinct whistleblower actions.124 Only the first 
subsection explicitly prohibits employer discrimination against whistleblowers who provide 
information to the Commission.125 The second subsection prohibits discrimination against 
whistleblowers “in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or 
administrative action of the Commission.”126 Therefore a whistleblower may receive protection for 
assisting the Commission with information provided by some other person or entity. The third 
                                                          
120 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (emphasis added). 
121 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010): 
[T]ransactions in securities ... are effected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to 
provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, 
including transactions ... to require appropriate reports, to remove impediments to and perfect the 
mechanisms of a national market system for securities ... and to impose requirements necessary to 
make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective ... and to insure the maintenance 
of fair and honest markets in such transactions. 
122 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §270.38a-1(a)(4) (2014) (requiring the chief compliance officer of a mutual fund to report the 
details of any material compliance matters to the fund’s board). 
123 Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Berman, v. 
Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., No. 1:14-CV-523-GHW-SN, 2014 WL 6860583, at 18  (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014). 
124 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A). 
125 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i). 
126 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(ii). 
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subsection prohibits employer discrimination against whistleblowers who make required or 
protected disclosures which fall into one of four categories, and many of these disclosures are 
permissibly made to entities other than the SEC.127 Under the first category, the anti-retaliation 
provision incorporates “disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.”128 Thus, the statutory language suggests that persons who notify entities pursuant to SOX 
reporting procedures should be afforded Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections. For example, in 
certain situations, SOX protects disclosures made to “a person with supervisory authority over the 
employee.”129 Thus, persons who receive protection under SOX should also receive anti-retaliation 
protection under Dodd-Frank. 
 Whistleblowers making required or protected disclosures under “this chapter, including 
section 78j-1(m) of this title”130 fall into the second category of the third subsection of the anti-
retaliation provision. Section 78j-1(m) specifies audit reporting requirements, while the 
Whistleblower Program specifically disallows awards “to any whistleblower who gains the 
information through the performance of an audit of financial statements.”131 This inclusion within 
the anti-retaliation provision evidences the fact that one may be a whistleblower for purposes of the 
anti-retaliation provision while one may not concurrently be privy to receive an award. 
Furthermore, section 78j-1 requires audit committees to establish procedures for “the confidential, 
anonymous submission by employees ... of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing 
matters.”132 Notifications submitted pursuant to required procedures should constitute protected 
                                                          
127 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
128 Id. 
129 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
130 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). 
131 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
132 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(b) (emphasis added). 
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disclosures and therefore should be considered lawful acts “done by the whistleblower,”133 
retaliation for which is prohibited. 
 The third category within the third subsection of the anti-retaliation provision specifies 
disclosures made under “section 1513(e) of Title 18.”134 Under section 1513(e), “whoever 
knowingly, with the intent to retaliate,” takes any harmful action “for providing to a law 
enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of 
any Federal offense,”135 is in violation of the statute. This situation came to fruition in Rosenblum 
v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C.,136 where an employee notified an FBI agent of potential 
securities violations and then received protection under the anti-retaliation provision. The anti-
retaliation provision explicitly includes disclosures made to law enforcement officers; this further 
evidences Congress’s intent not to restrict the definition of whistleblower.  
B. Case Law Analysis  
1. District Court Cases: Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., and Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C. 
 Under the explicit statutory language, anti-retaliation protection is only available to 
individuals who provide “information ... to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or 
regulation, by the Commission.”137  Thus, the statute may be interpreted to support my 
interpretation; amending the statute is unnecessary, but would provide clarity and prevent 
dispensable litigation. In the split among the courts, my interpretation reaches the same conclusion 
as courts which find the anti-retaliation provision to constitute an implied exception to the statutory 
whistleblower definition. These decisions include the Southern District of New York in Egan v. 
                                                          
133 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
134 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
135 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e). 
136 Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
137 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
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TradingScreen, Inc.,138 and the Federal District Court of Nebraska’s in Bussing v. COR Clearing, 
L.L.C.139 My interpretation is also in accordance with the majority of district court decisions, 
including the Southern District of New York in Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C.140 
Courts in this camp find the Whistleblower Program to be ambiguous and then defer to SEC 
regulations. 
 Further analysis of circuit cases reveals the imminence of a circuit split. One such case 
which nearly aligned with the majority of district courts was Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding 
Corp.,141 where an employee discovered that certain products were priced in a manner which 
potentially violated relevant securities regulation, then proceeded to inform a company supervisor 
instead of the SEC.142 On appeal, the Third Circuit referred to this circumstance as a “Dodd–Frank 
cause of action,”143 but the issue before the court concerned whether or not Dodd-Frank amended 
the SOX anti-arbitration provision. The Third Circuit held: “The text and structure of Dodd–Frank 
compel the conclusion that whistleblower retaliation claims ... are not exempt from predispute 
arbitration agreements.”144 This holding suggests the court would have found the person to be a 
statutory whistleblower, or would have deferred to the SEC regulations. Because the court did not 
affirm the decision below: “the Dodd–Frank Act is ambiguous with respect to who qualifies as a 
whistleblower for purposes of the anti-retaliation provision of the statute” and “the SEC's rule is a 
                                                          
138 Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
139 Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *1 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to 
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014). 
140 Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
141 Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149, 2014 WL 940703, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014), aff’d on 
other grounds, 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014). 
142 Id. at *2. 
143 Id. at *4. 
144 Id. at *5. 
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permissible construction of the statute and warrants judicial deference,” 145  the Third Circuit’s 
stance on the issue remains speculative.146  
 A Second Circuit case also provides insight. In Meng–Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G.,147 the Second 
Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of an employer’s motion to dismiss because the anti-
retaliation provision does not apply extraterritorially.148 There, an employee of a Chinese subsidiary 
whose German parent listed securities on an American exchange brought FCPA violations to the 
attention of his supervisors in China and Germany.149 The employee then allegedly experienced 
retaliation.150 Although the FCPA is situated among the securities laws, the court declined to 
determine whether “internal reporting of alleged misconduct, with or without his subsequent 
disclosures to the SEC, qualified him as a whistleblower under the Dodd–Frank Act.”151 Here, the 
District Court had previously held that section 806 of SOX does not require or protect disclosures 
of FCPA violations.152 Although withholding judgment on the issue of the direct conflict within the 
Whistleblower Program of Dodd-Frank, the Second Circuit noted the most direct consequence of 
the SEC regulations thereunder is that “anti-retaliation provisions protect even whistleblowers who, 
for various reasons enumerated in the statute, cannot collect a bounty.”153 The court stated that this 
“broadly suggests a separation between the conditions triggering the anti-retaliation provision and 
those triggering the bounty provision.”154 Whether or not the Second Circuit would have deferred 
                                                          
145 Id. at *6. 
146 Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149, 2014 WL 940703, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014), aff’d on 
other grounds, 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014). 
147 Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G., 978 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 330. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 333-334. 
152 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
153 Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G., 978 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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to the SEC’s interpretation, that a person may be protected by the anti-retaliation provision without 
being eligible for an award, also remains speculative. 
2. The Fifth Circuit Wrongly Decided Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) 
 The Fifth Circuit, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., held the Whistleblower Program 
“standing alone, expressly and unambiguously requires that an individual provide information to 
the SEC to qualify as a whistleblower for purposes of the anti-retaliation provision.”155 The court 
found that the anti-retaliation provision did not cause the Whistleblower Program to be 
ambiguous.156 The court demonstrated its view, that the anti-retaliation provision was not 
superfluous, through a hypothetical scenario: if an employee simultaneously files one report 
internally and one with the SEC, the employee would receive protection under the anti-retaliation 
provision even if the employer only knows of the existence of the internally filed report when it 
discriminates against the employee.157 The anti-retaliation provision would provide protection 
because the reporting employee would meet the statutory definition of a whistleblower as soon as 
any report is filed with the SEC. This case was wrongly decided. Under the court’s rationale, 
whether or not an employee receives anti-retaliation protection based on an internal report depends 
upon the existence of an external SEC report. This is mistaken because if an employer is unaware 
of a second disclosure, “any adverse employment action that the employer takes would appear to 
lack the requisite retaliatory intent.”158 This construction would impermissibly impose strict 
liability on an employer through excluding the necessary element of employer intent within a 
retaliation claim.159 
                                                          
155 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
156 Id. at 623. 
157 Id. at 627-628. 
158 Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Berman, v. 
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 The Southern District of New York adopted the Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C. holding 
in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C.160 There, the finance director of Neo@Ogilvy North America, a 
subsidiary of a publicly-traded foreign corporation, was responsible for compliance with Generally 
Acceptable Accounting Principles (GAAP) and proper financial reporting.161 The subsidiary was 
obligated under U.S. securities laws to detect and internally report “accounting irregularities, fraud 
and material compliance failures.”162 The District Court focused its attention on the reporting 
requirements contained in two other whistleblower laws passed alongside the Whistleblower 
Program.163 In the court’s opinion, under the first law, contained in an amendment to the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), Congress prohibited employers from retaliating against 
employees for reporting violations of the CEA, and “extended anti-retaliation protection only to 
those individuals who had reported such violations to the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission”164 (CFTC) or had “assisted in an investigation or judicial or administrative action of 
the CFTC based upon such information.”165  
 The protections mentioned mirror the first two subsections of the anti-retaliation provision 
of the Whistleblower Program. The court also commented that under the second law, contained in 
another section of Dodd–Frank, employers are prohibited from retaliating against employees who 
provide information about violations of any provision of law subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB).166 The court stated that under that law, “an 
                                                          
160 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., No. 14-CV-00523 GHW SN, 2014 WL 6865718, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014) 
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employee must first file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor and exhaust an administrative 
process before bringing a private action in district court.”167 The District Court then opined that 
“allowing a private right of action without first requiring contact with a government agency ... 
seems ... extraordinary.”168  
 The provision169 of the CFTC to which the Southern District of New York referred, in 
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., contains nearly identical language to the whistleblower protection 
provision at issue, and under the CFTC statute, Congress explicitly stated “nothing in this section 
shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any whistleblower under any 
Federal or State law.”170 Likewise, while the second law, which concerns information subject to the 
jurisdiction of the CFBP, provides preliminary authority to the Secretary of Labor and requires 
exhaustion of an administrative process before a claimant may bring a private action, the District 
Court failed to recognize that the statute also provides a process where the Secretary fails to act.171 
Under the CFPB provision, after a certain period of time has lapsed a “complainant may bring an 
action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate district court of the United States 
having jurisdiction.”172 This differs from the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program at issue because, 
unlike under the CFPB provision, here individuals are given standing for private causes of action 
in the first instance.173 
V. Incentives and Compliance 
 If future circuit opinions are plentiful and similarly reach the differing outcomes illustrated 
in the current district court and Fifth Circuit case law, whistleblowers would not retain incentives 
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to report initially through internal means. Currently, the SEC provides monetary incentives for 
individuals to report internally in the first instance, if appropriate.174 Whistleblowers who initially 
file internal reports should automatically be afforded Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program anti-
retaliation protection because the report should be viewed as “protected” under the second category 
within the third subsection of disclosures enumerated within the anti-retaliation provision, which 
includes disclosures made under “this chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of this title.”175 Because 
the SEC incentivizes whistleblowers initially to report internally, disclosures made pursuant to 
incentives are arguably made under “this chapter.”176 
 Incentives for internal compliance serve to enhance the SEC’s enforcement efforts because 
a company may have better insight into the claim and may make its findings available for the 
SEC.177 Such screening of reports through internal means may limit false or frivolous claims, 
provide the entity an opportunity to resolve the violation and report its resolution to the 
Commission, and allow the Commission to use its resources more efficiently.178 Thus, allowing 
individuals initially to report internally provides a mechanism by which erroneous tips may be 
eliminated, and also allows the SEC to avoid the incurring of costs to process and validate 
information.179  
 In determining the amount of an award to be paid, one SEC regulation expressly incentivizes 
the utilization of a company’s internal reporting system: “Factors that may increase the size of an 
award include ... the extent the whistleblower participated in a company’s internal compliance 
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systems.”180 The regulation also discourages the undermining of internal compliance: “Factors that 
may decrease the size of an award include ... any interference with or undermining of a company’s 
internal compliance systems.”181 
 Although the SEC encourages internal reporting in the first instance, a Company may be 
without recourse after it receives information through an internal report because one SEC rule 
“prohibits companies from taking any action to impede whistleblowers from reporting possible 
securities violations to the SEC.”182 The SEC has asserted that an effective compliance program 
should allow for confidential submissions through channels which may include anonymous hotlines 
and ombudsmen.183 The program should also include an effective process to investigate and respond 
to submissions.184 After all, internal investigations “can be among the most powerful weapons in 
the law enforcement arsenal.”185 
 Admittedly, in practice the regulations may not actually serve to incentivize forward 
thinking whistleblowers to pursue a course of conduct which will, years later, increase the amount 
of their potential award. More than likely, if the only question at issue is the amount of an award to 
be paid, the SEC has already received information through some means and therefore the reporting 
person would satisfy the statutory definition of whistleblower. One practical effect of the anti-
retaliation provision is that it prohibits employer retaliation by placing employers on notice that 
they may not retaliate against employees who engage in whistleblowing activities. In a situation 
such as the strict liability scenario proposed by the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), an 
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employer may be inclined to terminate an employee immediately after it receives an internal report 
because the necessary retaliatory intent element would not be present. An employer should do so 
in anticipation of losing this ability after it acquires knowledge of the SEC’s involvement. If internal 
reports made in conformity with the anti-retaliation provision were unequivocally found to have 
been made by persons who satisfy the statutory definition of whistleblower, then employers would 
instantly be put on notice that “just cause,” other than the fact that the employee betrayed the 
company through whistleblowing, must first exist before the whistleblower is terminated. 
VI. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the potential ambiguity of the Whistleblower Program has caused courts to 
interpret the statute inconsistently, and judicial opinion to conflict. One possible reading of the 
statute holds that employer anti-retaliation protection should only be available to whistleblowers 
who provide “information ... to the Commission.”186 This reading is unsound because it causes the 
anti-retaliation provision to become superfluous, and is inconsistent with the purposes of security 
regulation. My interpretation of the statute and regulations thereunder reveals that employer anti-
retaliation protection should only be available to whistleblowers who provide “information ... to the 
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”187 Under my 
theory, the Commission was given direct authority to establish the manner in which it would receive 
information, and the Commission established this manner through various regulations which 
implement Dodd-Frank.  
 Two of the three judicial approaches in existence reach conclusions which are in line with 
my theory. The first consists of a minority of courts which find the Whistleblower Program 
unambiguous, and also hold that it protects whistleblowers who make disclosures enunciated in the 
                                                          
186 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
187 Id. 
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anti-retaliation provision. Here, disclosures include those made to entities other than the SEC. The 
second consists of a majority of district courts which find the Whistleblower Program ambiguous, 
in that it contains provisions which directly conflict. Here, courts defer to the SEC’s interpretation. 
The SEC’s interpretation mirrors the first judicial approach which is in line with my theory. My 
theory differs in that it finds the Whistleblower Program to provide protection to individuals so long 
as the disclosure is within the jurisdiction of the SEC, and at some point in time the SEC assents 
that protection should be available. This causes disclosures explicitly provided for in the anti-
retaliation provision to provide protection to whistleblowers because the SEC has issued 
regulations, for purposes of anti-retaliation protection, which incorporate anti-retaliation provision 
disclosures into the statutory definition of whistleblower. Because the SEC has authority to 
reclassify persons and reports, and has stated that it reserves the right to suspend requirements 
during extraordinary circumstances, the SEC possesses the power to extend anti-retaliation 
protection to any person who makes any report, as long as the disclosure is within the SEC’s 
jurisdiction.  
 Lastly, the SEC provides incentives for companies to establish internal compliance 
programs, and also rewards employees who initially report securities violations through internal 
means. Typically, compliance programs also provide incentives for employees to report internally. 
This lowers the overall risk of penalties a company may face, as well as lowers costs the SEC must 
pay to investigate complaints. If whistleblowers who make internal reports concerning securities 
laws violations were not protected by the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision, then employees 
would be discouraged from reporting internally. This may lead to an overall decline in corporate 
compliance as well as an increase of costs for both the company and the SEC. This risk constitutes 
even greater reason to find the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program unambiguous. Companies, 
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whistleblowers and the SEC all benefit where whistleblowers who notify entities other than the 
SEC concerning information which is within the jurisdiction of the Commission, are safeguarded 
by the anti-retaliation protection afforded under Dodd-Frank. 
 
